

STATE OF WISCONSIN

CIRCUIT COURT 

MARQUETTE COUNTY

COUNTY OF MARQUETTE,

TRANSCRIPT OF

Plaintiff,

ORAL DECISION

vs.

Case Number: 02-CV-7

LABOR and INDUSTRY REVIEW COMMISSION, et al., Defendants.

TRANSCRIPT OF ORAL DECISION

A transcript of the Oral Decision in regard to the aboveentitled action before, MARQUETTE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE HONORABLE RICHARD O. WRIGHT, held at the Marquette County Courthouse, Montello, Wisconsin, on August 13, 2002.

APPEARANCES:

ATTORNEY BERNARD BULT, Marquette County Corporation Counsel, P.O. Box 186, Montello, Wisconsin 53949, appearing in person and representing the plaintiff.

ATTORNEY DAVID NANCE, P.O. Box 8126, Madison, Wisconsin 53708, appearing telephonically and representing the defendants.

## PROCEEDINGS 1 This is the matter of the 2 THE COURT: County of Marguette, plaintiff, versus LIRC. 3 is a matter of certiorari, I believe. 4 MR. BULT: Yes. That is correct. 5 THE COURT: Appeal from a decision of the Labor and Industry Review Commission. Let's have 7 the appearances formally here. 9 MR. BULT: Your Honor, Bernard Bult, 1.0 Marquette County Corporation Counsel, is appearing 11 on behalf of the plaintiff, Marquette County. MR. NANCE: Your Honor, my name is 12 13 Attorney David Nance. I am appearing on behalf of 14 the Labor Industry Review Commission. 15 THE COURT: Okay. Without inviting 16 reargument, I have read the briefs and reviewed the 17 file, the record. Is there anything further, 18 emphasis on the further, first from the plaintiff here? 19 20 MR. BULT: No, Your Honor. I believe that 21 the facts were pretty much agreed to by both 22 parties and the arguments that were made in the 23 various briefs, I think, cover the issues.

THE COURT: Mr. Nance?

have no further argument.

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MR. NANCE: I agree, Your Honor. I think that the briefs adequately frame the issues and the matter is ready for decision.

THE COURT: I guess that there really is one issue, that is interpretation of a statute. I think that the plaintiff is correct in one part here, is that there is no argument made by the -- how about the commission?

MR. NANCE: Commission or LIRC will do just fine.

THE COURT: Well, we do not talk in alphabet soup up here.

MR. NANCE: I have a hard time saying it myself.

any argument about the burden or the -- whether or not the Court should give any deference to the Commission's decision on this, we presume that it is entirely one of law, and it does also appear that it is a case of first impression, so I don't think that the Court owes any deference to the Commission on the issue that is before the Court.

Am I correct that there is no argument about that?

MR. NANCE: No, Your Honor. We're not going to contend that we have any experience in

this matter. We think that you're correct that the matter is one for your decision de novo.

THE COURT: I also have to always note for these kind of cases that the Court of Appeals does not give two bits what my rulings are, other than it causes them more work on occasion. The sole issue is the interpretation of the statute, and whether or not the particular individual employee or employees or whether or not they are exempt under the unemployment, you know, employment compensation statute in Wisconsin.

First, I will mention that plaintiff's case, as the Court notes <u>Rojas vs. Fitch</u>, in that case they are not referring to any temporary emergency personal. Bliss vs. ILHR -- that's what you used to be called?

MR. NANCE: Yes.

THE COURT: It refers to a wholly different exception, and I read through and it makes no reference to any irregular aspect of the employment exemption. The same is true with the National Safety Associates case. I don't find -- except as they may be cited to support a position that is generally what the statute is referring to. I don't find them very helpful.

In any event, the Court does not see any ambiguity in the statute. You can read the statute. I think that it is clear on its face. What the exception covers, and it covers persons who are serving solely on a temporary basis, in case of some of the enumerated disaster type emergencies, the specific terms defined in class of emergencies referred to.

Among the specific terms that are used to define the class of emergencies is the term fire. That is the only term, and in the enumerated class, that could conceivably apply to an individual disaster. That is the wrong way to put it, an individual's, apostrophe s on the individual. There we go. The others refer to the community in a wider scale.

This Court believes that it is clear that the statute has reference to those who would be employed to handle unexpected general emergencies, not the irregular yet frequent individual accidents and trauma suffered by a few individuals at the time. Neither does the exemption apply with the nature of these employees by their terms of employment. Temporary is not the same thing as intermittent. Temporary is not the same thing as

irregular. Those terms are different. Temporary means temporary.

The Court does not believe that it matters who sets it and how the hours of employment are set.

They are getting paid when they are on call. It is on a regular basis, those EMS, and the other employees that we're referring to, they are not solely called to work in emergencies, but are employed to be ready for the call, as well.

I don't think that the <u>Local 695</u> case, also cited, is applicable for these reasons. The statute uses the term solely, and it presumably uses that term advisedly. That is a very limiting term. The term solely, it accomplishes, in this statute, a very limited exemption from coverage. The agency's decision, the Court believes, should be upheld and the petition be dismissed.

MR. NANCE: Thank you, Your Honor. Should I submit an order for your signature?

THE COURT: The best way to do that really is for the reasons stated on the record, the petition is dismissed.

MR. NANCE: Very good.

THE COURT: That's all that you need to

do.

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1	MR. NANCE: I will submit a draft and give
2	to Mr. Bult as to form and then get that to you.
3	MR. BULT: Very good.
4	THE COURT: Good bye.
5	(WHICH CONCLUDED THE PROCEEDINGS)
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STATE OF WISCONSIN ) )SS. MARQUETTE COUNTY )

I, Jill M. (Gorsuch) Bartol, Registered Professional Reporter, in the State of Wisconsin, do hereby certify that the above foregoing is a true and complete transcript of the hearing held in the above matter on August 13, 2002.

Jiql M. (Gorsuch) Bartol, RPR

County of Marquette State of Wisconsin

> Notary Public State of Wisconsin Until January 12, 2003